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Introduction
Nigeria's economy is growing at an
impressive rate compared to the
historical. This reflects in part
increased investor confidence due
to the improvements in
macroeconomic management and
positive dividends of the new found
economic direction and general
political stability.
However, the
renewed optimism is unlikely to be
sustained if appreciable progress is
not made to advance growth,
general macroeconomic stability
and poverty reduction.
The increased awareness of the
need to tackle poverty has focused
attention on the role of
macroeconomic policy in achieving
social as well as macroeconomic
objectives.
H o w e v e r, t h e
preservation of macroeconomic
stability is important, not as an end
to itself, but as a necessary
precondition for sustained
economic growth, which is the
single most important factor
influencing poverty reduction.
Without a disciplined
macroeconomic stance, the
achievement of sustained
economic growth and social
objectives becomes much difficult.
With responsible growth which
embraces both environmental
sustainability and social
development, human welfare is
increased through improved
consumption, human capital, social
equity, all of which target poverty
reduction.

1

In order to formulate sustainable
macroeconomic and social policies,
there is a need to understand the
diversities in the country, the social
context and how they are linked to
poverty and livelihoods.
Macroeconomic policies are those
policies that have direct or indirect
impact on key variables such as the
inflation rate, the exchange rate, the
external current account balance,
the fiscal deficit or the level of
international reserves.
These
policies are primarily fiscal,
monetary, or relate to the exchange
rate. They are usually formulated
with a view to their impact on the
economy as a whole, rather than on
individuals, groups or sectors.
However, a given policy change
may have differential impacts on
different groups. Structural policies
on the other hand, aim at improving
the efficiency of resource allocation;
strengthening economic incentives;
removing impediments to the
smooth function of markets and to
private sector development; and
expanding the overall productive
capacity of the economy.
Exchange Rate Basics
Money serves as a medium of
exchange that simplifies
transactions between millions of
people interacting in a market
place. Transactions between
people who live in different
countries use different mediums of
exchange.
Cross-border
transactions therefore typically
require a corresponding exchange
of one currency for another. An

exchange rate describes the price
of one currency in terms of
another.
The nominal exchange rate
between two countries is the one
country's currency in terms of the
other country's currency. It is the
domestic currency units per unit of
foreign currency. So the Nigerian
naira/U.S. Dollar exchange rate is
given as 129 Naira per U.S. Dollar
instead of 0077519 Dollars per
Naira.
Nonetheless, we can
multiply the price of a good
denominated in foreign currency
by the nominal exchange rate to
convert it to domestic currency
terms; we can divide the price of
goods denominated in domestic
currency by the nominal exchange
rate to convert them to foreign
currency terms. An increase in the
nominal exchange rate is called
depreciation of the domestic
currency, i.e. the Nigerian Naira
has decreased in value (more
naira are needed to buy one unit of
foreign currency). A decrease in
the nominal exchange rate is an
appreciation of the domestic
currency, i.e. the naira has
increased in value (fewer naira are
needed to buy one unit of foreign
currency.)
Changes in the exchange rate
change the relative price of goods
in two countries. However, the
nominal exchange rate is not the
only variable that affects the
relative price of goods in two
countries, the price levels in each
country matter as well. Hence the
use of real exchange rate to
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compare prices in two countries. I will use the symbol R to denote the real exchange rate, which can be defined as

R = eP*
P
R is the relative price of foreign goods and can be further elaborated as
R = $/foreign currency* foreign currency price of goods = $ price of foreign goods
$ price of domestic goods
$ price of domestic goods
An increase in R is known as a
depreciation of the real exchange
rate (foreign goods become more
expensive) and a decrease in R is
an appreciation of the real
exchange rate (foreign goods
become cheaper).
However,
nominal exchange rate appreciation
can cause real exchange rate
appreciation, all else equal, i.e. if
relative prices in the two economies
do not change. Also, changes in
prices can cause the real exchange
rate to fluctuate without an
underlying change in the nominal
exchange rate. An increase in
domestic prices, all else equal, will
cause the real exchange rate to
appreciate; a decrease in foreign
prices, all else equal, will cause a
real exchange rate appreciation. A
decrease in domestic prices, all else
equal, will cause the real exchange
rate to depreciate, but an increase in
foreign prices, will also cause a real
exchange rate depreciation.
Exchange Rate Policy
Allowing for an overvalued currency
to depreciate can enhance export
competitiveness and raise the local
currency income of exporters.
However, the cost of imported
inputs and consumables (and,
possibly, of services such as urban
transport) will also rise, leading to an
erosion of the real purchasing
power of household incomes.
Changes in exchange rates will thus
have both income-raising and price-

raising effects, giving rise to net
benefits or detriments that differ
across socioeconomic groups.
Key factors that determine the net
impact are the composition of the
consumption basket and who
purchases what within the
household. For example, women
may not benefit as much as men
from a depreciation/devaluation2.
Real earnings in the informal sector
(where more women than men are
employed) and nontraded sector
may fall, affect overall consumption
and welfare. The urban poor may
be more adversely affected as
consumers, but may also benefit if
their output is exportable or is an
import substitute.
There is also some social impact
arising from various exchange rate
policies. For instance, in the area
of health care, increased costs of
imported medicines may lead poor
people to use more traditional local
medicines or go untreated. These
differential impacts mean that
attenuating measures may be
necessary to protect some
vulnerable groups, even though the
net benefit for the society as a
whole remains positive.
Classifying Regimes
Beyond the traditional fixed-floating
dichotomy lies a spectrum of
exchange rate regimes. The de
facto behavior of an exchange rate,
moreover, may diverge from its de

2

jure classification.
While it is customary to speak of
fixed, stable and floating exchange
rates, regimes actually span a
continuum, ranging from pegs to
target zones, to floats with heavy,
light, or no intervention. The
traditional dichotomy can mask
important differences among
regimes. Accordingly, this analysis
uses a three-way classification:
pegged, intermediate (i.e., floating
rates, but within a predetermined
range), and floating.
Regimes can be classified
according to either the publicly
stated commitment of the central
bank (a de jure classification) or the
observed behavior of the
exchange rate (a de facto
classification). Neither method is
entirely satisfactory. A country that
claims to have a pegged exchange
rate might in fact instigate frequent
changes in parity. On the other
hand, a country might experience
very small exchange rate
movements, even though the
central bank has no obligation to
maintain parity.
Inflation
Pegging the exchange rate can
lower inflation by inducing greater
policy discipline and instilling
greater confidence in the currency.
Empirically, both effects are
important.
Policymakers

have

long

Women are often involved in the food crop sector and will have to face higher costs of transportation, fertilizers, and other imported
inputs. These higher costs may also raise food prices, again affecting women, who are responsible for feeding the family within the
household. A currency depreciation may make export crops, usually under the control of men, more profitable, but may not benefit the
household as a whole since income may not be pooled. Meanwhile, women are responsible for buying food and medicines with their own
resources, which may not have increased in value.
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maintained that a pegged
exchange rate can be an antiinflationary tool. Two reasons are
typically cited. A pegged exchange
rate provides a highly visible
commitment and thus raises the
political costs of loose monetary
and fiscal policies. To the extent that
the peg is credible, there is a
stronger readiness to hold domestic
currency, which reduces the
inflationary consequences of a
given expansion in the money
supply.

compared with 14 percent for
intermediate regimes, and 16
percent for floating regimes.
The differences among regimes are
starker for the lower-income
countries, where the differential
between pegged and floating rates
was almost 10 percentage points.
As might be expected, countries
without capital controls tended to
have lower inflation in general.
Even for these countries, however,
inflation was lower under pegged
regimes compared with either
intermediate or floating exchange
rates.

Inflation Performance

Although inflation performance is
generally better under pegged
exchange rates, the last panel in
Chart 1 illustrates an important
caveat: mere declaration of a
pegged exchange rate is
insufficient to reap the full antiinflationary benefits. Countries that

Inflation over our sample averaged
10 percent a year, with pronounced
differences in various exchange
rate regimes (Chart 1). Countries
with pegged or stable exchange
rates had an average annual
inflation rate of 8 percent,

changed their parity frequently-though notionally maintaining a
pegged exchange rate--on average
experienced 13 percent inflation.
While this is still better than the
performance under nonpegged
exchange rates (17 percent), it is
significantly worse than countries
that maintained a stable parity (7
percent).
Since there was a preponderance of
pegged exchange rate regimes in
the 1960s--when inflation rates were
low--the association between low
inflation and pegged rates might be
more an artifact of the general
macroeconomic climate than a
property of the regime itself. One
way to purge the data of such effects
is to measure inflation rates for each
regime relative to the average
inflation rate (across all regimes) in
that year. Doing so, however, leaves
the story largely unchanged: as

Chart 1. Inflation Performance
(In percent per year)
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Chart 1 shows, under pegged
rates, inflation was 3 percentage
points lower than under
intermediate and 6 percentage
points less than under floating
regimes. Again, countries with only
occasional changes in parity fared
significantly better than those with
frequent changes.
Explaining the Differences
What accounts for these results?
They derive, in fact, from two
separate effects. The first is
discipline. Countries with pegged
exchange rates have lower rates of
g r o w t h i n m o n e y s u p p l y,
presumably because of the political
costs of abandoning a peg. The
growth of broad money (currency
and deposits) averaged 17 percent

More Open Economics

Floating

a year under pegged exchange
rates compared with almost 30
percent under floating regimes.
This difference holds regardless of
the income level of the country.
In addition, for a given growth rate
of the money supply, higher money
demand (the desire to hold money
rather than spend it) will imply lower
inflation. Pegged exchange rates,
by enhancing confidence, can
engender a greater demand for the
domestic currency. This will be
reflected in a lower velocity of
circulation and a faster decline of
domestic interest rates. In the
extreme case of perfect credibility,
domestic interest rates--even in
countries with a history of high
inflation--should fall immediately to
the world level. Over the sample
period, nominal interest rates have
55
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tended to rise, but the rate of
increase for countries with floating
rates was almost 6 percent, as
against 2 percent for countries with
pegged rates. It was actually
highest for countries with
intermediate regimes, where the
growth rate of interest rates was
almost 9 percent. A change in
nominal interest rates is of
importance because a fall in these
rates will lead to a stronger
demand for money. But the level of
real interest rates (i.e., the nominal
rates adjusted for inflation) also
gives a direct measure of
confidence. On average, the real
interest rates were 0.2 percent a
year under pegged regimes, 1.8
percent under intermediate
regimes, and 2.3 percent under
floating regimes.
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For a variety of reasons--including
interest rates that are set by the
authorities rather than being
determined by the market--the
greater confidence that pegged
exchanges can bring may not be
fully reflected in the observed
domestic interest rate.
Nonetheless, it is possible to
identify the "confidence effect" of
various regimes by considering the
residual inflation once the effects of
money expansion, real growth, and
domestic interest rates have been
removed. A higher residual inflation
implies lower confidence.

nominal exchange rate regime on
the growth of output. Typically,
arguments focus on the impact on
investment and international trade.
Advocates argue that pegged
exchange rates foster investment
by reducing policy uncertainties
and lowering real interest rates. But
equally, by eliminating an important
adjustment mechanism, fixed
exchange rates can increase
protectionist pressure, distort price
signals in the economy, and
prevent the efficient allocation of
resources across sectors.
Growth Performance

Do pegged rates lead to greater
confidence? They do. Chart 1
shows the residual inflation rates.
Countries with pegged exchange
rates had inflation 2 percentage
points lower than those with
intermediate regimes, and 4
percentage points lower than those
with floating regimes. This
differential in favor of pegged rates
is as large as 6 percentage points in
the lower-income countries, but
only 3 percentage points for
countries without capital controls-perhaps because abjuring capital
controls itself inspires confidence in
the domestic currency.
Not only do countries with pegged
exchange rates have lower inflation
on average, they are also
associated with lower inflation
variability.
Growth
The exchange rate regime can
influence economic growth through
investment or increased
productivity. Pegged regimes have
higher investment; floating regimes
have faster productivity growth. On
net, per capita GDP growth was
slightly faster under floating
regimes.
Economic theory has relatively little
to say about the effects of the

Annual GDP growth per capita
averaged 1.6 percent over our
sample. Although differences exist
across exchange rate regimes,
these are generally less marked
than the differences in inflation
rates (Chart 2). Different samples,
m o r e o v e r, l e a d t o v a r i e d
conclusions about growth under
fixed and floating exchange rates.
Growth was actually fastest under
the intermediate regimes,
averaging more than 2 percent a
year. It was 1.4 percent a year
under pegged exchange rates and
1.7 percent under floating rates.
This pattern emerges mainly
because of the lower middleincome and low-income countries;
growth was somewhat higher under
pegged rates for the industrial and
upper middle-income countries.
Just as inflation was generally
lower in the 1960s, growth rates
tended to be higher. Controlling for
this widens the differential in favor
of floating exchange rates to 0.8
percent over all countries, and as
much as 1.5 percent for the lowerincome countries.
Explaining the Differences
By definition, economic growth can
be explained by the use of more
capital and labor (the factors of
56

production) or by residual
productivity growth. This
productivity growth reflects both
technological progress and-perhaps more important--changes
in the economic efficiency with
which capital and labor are used.
Investment rates were highest
under pegged exchange rates--by
as much as 2 percentage points of
GDP--with the largest difference for
the industrial and upper middleincome countries and almost none
for the lower-income countries. With
higher investment rates and lower
output growth, productivity
increases must have been smaller
under fixed exchange rates.
Part of the higher productivity
growth under floating rates is
reflected in faster growth of external
trade. Trade growth (measured as
the sum of export growth and import
growth) is almost 3 percentage
points higher under floating rates.
The lower-income countries--where
real exchange rate misalignments
under fixed rates have been more
common--show an even larger
difference in trade growth between
pegged and floating exchange
rates.
While not overwhelming, the
evidence suggests that fixing the
nominal exchange rate can prevent
relative prices (including, perhaps,
real wages) from adjusting. This
lowers economic efficiency. Part,
though not all, of this lower
productivity growth is offset by
higher investment under pegged
exchange rates. A comparison of
countries that switched regimes
shows that a move to floating
exchange rates results in an
increase of GDP growth of 0.3
percentage points one year after the
switch and of more than 1
percentage point three years after
the switch. One manifestation of the
rigidities that pegged exchange
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rates can engender is the higher
volatility of GDP growth and of
employment. As the last rows of
Charts 7-12 indicate, GDP growth
was more volatile under pegged
exchange rates, as was
employment.
Poverty in Nigeria
Poverty has been defined in various
ways. These include the inability to
attain a minimum standard of living
(World Bank, 1990) and in “relative”
( e.g., unable to buy a pre-specified
consumption basket) and
“absolute” terms ( i.e. below US $ 1
per day per person), among others.
There are different types of poverty,
that is, income poverty and basic
needs (food, education, health care
etc.) poverty. While poverty in the
developed countries is basically
income determined, in the
developing countries, it is, in
addition, the result of deprivation
and lack of access to basic services
(e.g. safe drinking water, health
care, education and housing).
Other dimensions of poverty are
cultural, climatic, ecological and
historical.
The relative conceptualization of
poverty is largely income based.
Accordingly, poverty depicts a
situation in which a given material
means of sustenance, within a
given society, is hardly enough for
subsistence (Townsend, 1962). It is
important that poverty must be
conceived, defined and measured
in absolute quantitative ways
relevant for policy analysis.
Poverty in Nigeria is widespread
and deep. The country
progressively slipped from being
one of the middle-income oil
producing countries in the late
1970s and early 1980s to one of the
lowest-income countries in the
early 1990s. Moreover, the 2004
edition of the UNDP's Human

Development Report placed
Nigeria in the 151st position, based
on the Human Development Index.
Casual evidence of the growing
intensity of poverty in the country
can be glimpsed from rising
incidence of mass unemployment,
urban vagrancies and
homelessness among the poorest
groups, diminished access to
quality foods and nutrition, healthcare and educational facilities, and
the rising incidence of street
begging, among others. Other
factors that encourage and can
aggravate poverty, especially in
low-income countries include poor
governance and corruption.
Concern about poverty in Nigeria is
very great: The Nigerian situation is
a paradox. It is a rich country
inhabited by poor people-poverty in
the midst of plenty. The country is
richly endowed with a diversity of
human and natural resources from
which the bulk of its wealth is
derived. The immense waste of
human resources in Nigeria due to
poverty can be partly attributed to
the unhealthy state of the Nigerian
economy. The growth rate of the
real gross domestic product of
Nigeria since the early 1990s has
not been encouraging. The rates
have been very low in the last five
years. From the rate of 8.3 percent
in 1990, it declined to 1.0 percent in
1994 and then rose to 2.2 percent in
1995 and to 3.7 percent in 1997. By
1998, it dropped to 2.6 percent and
gradually increased to 3.9 percent
in 2001, but by 2002, it had dropped
again to 3.3 percent, (see table
2.2). These figures, when viewed in
comparison to the population
growth of an average 2.8 percent
(UNSN, 2001) per annum, leave
little room for substantial
improvement in living standards. A
petroleum and gas producing
country, Nigeria has, since the mid1970s, been heavily dependent on
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revenue from crude oil for much of
its domestic and foreign
expenditure requirements. As Table
2.2 illustrates, crude oil export has
accounted for over 95% of the
country's total export earnings over
the past two decades. The country
currently (2004) produces 2.65
million barrels of crude oil per day,
which, at the prevailing international
prices of $53-$54 per barrel,
represent a huge resource inflow.
The contribution of the primary
sector has remained relatively
stable over the period, 52.2 per cent
in 1990 to 52.3 percent in 1999 and
47.8 percent by 2002, while that of
the secondary sector has
consistently declined from 1991
except for 2002 when it rose slightly
to 10.5 percent. The tertiary sector's
contribution has increased
marginally over the years, from 37.2
per cent in 1990 to 39.4 percent by
1999. It rose to 45.2 percent in 2000
before declining to 41.7 percent by
2002. The diversification index has
remained relatively stable,
suggesting that no fundamental
structural changes have taken
place in the country.
Causes of Poverty
The worsening of poverty in Nigeria
has been traced to several factors:
poor and inconsistent
macroeconomic policies, weak
diversification of the economic
base, gross economic
mismanagement, weak
intersectoral linkages, persistence
of structural bottlenecks in the
economy, high import dependence
and heavy reliance on crude oil
exports, are high on the list of its
causes. Other factors include the
long absence of democracy and the
usurpation of political power by the
military elite, lack of transparency
and high level of corruption,
declining productivity and low
morale in the public service, as well
as ineffective implementation of
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relevant policies and programmes
(UNSN, 2001).
The basic causes of poverty in
Nigeria have been identified to
include, inadequate access to
employment opportunities for the
poor, lack or inadequate access to
assets such as land and capital by
the poor; inadequate access to the
means of fostering rural
development in poor regions;
inadequate access to markets for
the goods and services that the
poor produce; inadequate access to
education, health, sanitation and
water services; the destruction of
the natural resource endowments
which has led to reduced
productivity of agriculture, forestry
and fisheries; the inadequate
access to assistance by those who
are the victims of transitory poverty
such as droughts, floods, pests and
civil disturbances and inadequate
involvement of the poor in the
design of development
pro g ra mme s. Th e se
multidimensional causes of
material and non-material
deprivation make poverty to be very
endemic in Nigeria (FOS, 1996)
.
Similarly, poverty in Nigeria has
geographical and gender
perspectives. According to the
UNDP (2001), the poverty level in
Nigeria is lowest in South East (53.5
per cent), and highest in the North
West (77 per cent). The agricultural
sector has the highest population of
poor people, increasing from 31.5
per cent in 1980 to 70 per cent in

1996 (FOS, 1999). Findings from
the poverty and development study
conducted by the CBN/World Bank
(1999) indicated that women are
more prone to poverty than men.
The study asserted that the
consequences of being a woman in
Nigeria include the following: the
likelihood of having fewer
opportunities than men; of coping
with the material aspects of well
being; of having very limited
strategies and safety nets; and of
constantly living with a sense of
insecurity. While poverty tends to
cluster geographically, there are
other macroeconomic shocks that
affect poor households in every
region. Among them, inflation has
been identified as one significant
cause of poverty deepening. The
inflation rate has been growing
rapidly since 1990, as shown in
Table 2.2. From a figure of 7.4
percent in 1990, it increased to 72.8
percent in 1995. The rate dropped
substantially to 6.6 percent in 1999
and by 2002, it had increased to
12.9 percent, which was still lower
than the 18.9 percent recorded in
2001(CBN, 2002). The implication
of this is that the purchasing power
of the poor has been eroded over
the years and consequently
aggravated the poverty
phenomenon among the poor. The
continued pressure on the price
level may be attributed to the high
government fiscal deficit financed
largely by the CBN2, which resulted
in excess liquidity in the banking
system and a substantial increase
in domestic aggregate demand.
Other factors were increases in
production costs, including interest
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rates and high transportation
costs, arising from a sharp rise in
the price of petroleum products.
The rise in the price level was
mainly induced during this period
by the depreciation of the Naira
exchange rate and the excessive
growth in domestic liquidity (CBN,
2002).
According to the NLSS 2004, the
incidence of poverty in Nigeria,
using the three objective
measures, viz: relative poverty
line, absolute poverty line and one
dollar per day measure, declined
compared to the 1996 figures. The
three measures show the
incidence of poverty as ranging
from 51.6 per cent (one dollar per
day measure to 54.7 per cent
(absolute poverty line). The
incidence of poverty (also known
as poverty headcount) is the
proportion of the population whose
consumption falls below the
poverty line.
The poverty incidence reduced
from 65.6 per cent in 1996 to 54.7
per cent in 2004 but the number of
poor people increased
substantially from about 67 million
to 71 million using the absolute
poverty line index. Moreover, the
results of the people's selfassessment of their own poverty
status indicate over 75.0 per cent
poverty incidence. In other words,
three out of every four Nigerians
believe that they are poor, thus
creating doubts on the observed
poverty reduction.
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Nigeria: Population and Poverty Incidence Trends

Year

Estimated

Total Poverty Incidence (Per Population

Population (million) cent)

in

Poverty (million)

1980

65

28.1

18.26

1985

75

46.3

34.73

1992

91.5

42.7

39.07

1996

102.3

65.6

67.11

2004

126.3

54.4

68.70

3

4

3

Table 2 shows that both extreme poverty and moderate poverty are higher in the rural sector than in the urban sector.

4

Table 3 shows that male-headed households have more poverty on the average than female-headed households at the national
level as well as in the rural and urban sectors
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Table 4: Poverty Incidence by Different Poverty Lines
Poverty line

Poor

Non-poor

Relative poverty line

54.41

45.59

Absolute poverty line

54.68

45.32

One dollar per day poverty 51.55

48.45

line
Self Assessment

75.50

Nevertheless, perhaps, the
reduction in poverty incidence is due
to the observed improved growth
rate in recent years. But in the
absence of time series data on
inequality, it is not clear if
improvement in inequality
contributed to the observed
reduction in poverty. Also, data
limitation prevents a definitive
statement as to whether or not the

24.50

growth is pro-poor. The point
though is that the relatively high
economic growth between 1997
and 2004 succeeded in lifting out of
poverty only 17 persons out of every
100.
Poverty in Nigeria is largely a rural
phenomenon. The incidence of
poverty as well as its depth and
severity are higher in the rural areas
then in the urban areas. More than

half of rural households are
absolutely poor while the
proportion is much less in the
urban areas. The high incidence of
poverty in the rural areas is due to
their dependence on low
productivity agriculture, lack of
access to opportunities and poor
social and economic
infrastructure.

Figure 2:1 Poverty Incidence in Nigeria

70
60
50
40
(%)

63.8
30

54.68
43.13

20
10
0
National

Exchange Rate Stability
Exchange rate stability refers to the
lack of movement over time (usually
two years) of the exchange rate of a
country. It requires the observance
of the normal fluctuation margins
provided by the Exchange Rate

Urban

Mechanism for at least two years,
without devaluing against the
currency of any other member
state, on its own initiative, and
without severe tensions. Exchange
rate stability is one of the principal
factors for any successful effort to
increase private sector

60

Rural

development, economic growth and
macroeconomic stability. Although
it is difficult to prove,
macroeconomic instability has
generally been associated with poor
growth performance.
Without
macroeconomic stability, without
exchange rate stability, growth in
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investment will be frustrated
because foreign investors will stay
away and resources will be diverted
elsewhere.
Macroeconomic policies influence
and contribute to the attainment of
rapid, sustainable economic growth
aimed at poverty reduction in a
variety of ways. By pursuing sound
economic policies, policymakers
send clear signals to the private
sector. The extent to which policy
makers are able to establish a track
record of policy implementation will
influence private sector confidence,
which will, in turn, impact upon
investment, economic growth , and
poverty outcomes.
Macroeconomic volatility and high
output fluctuation, resulting from
exogenous shocks and instable
policy regimes, may impact on
poverty (Breen/Garcia-Penalosa
1999). The income of the poor may
be affected by a negative impact of
macroeconomic volatility on
investment and growth due to
distorted price signals and expected
rate of return.
Increased
precautionary savings caused by
higher uncertainty about future
income may also lead to either
decreased or increased economic
growth. In addition, credit market
effects, i.e. higher incidence of
credit rationing or increased risk
premium and borrowing rates for
private firms may negatively affect
the income of the poor.
Identifying the predominant
economic shocks and the structural
features of a specific country and
choosing the exchange rate
regimes which best insulates the
economy against shocks could be
seen as one reason for different
impact of exchange rate
arrangements on pro-poor growth.
This is based on the assumption
that exchange rate regimes
dampen or amplify the negative
effects of exogenous shocks and
adjustment processes.
From
Mundell-Flemming framework,
fixed exchange rate regimes are
assumed to stabilize output in case
of nominal shocks to domestic asset
markets, while real shocks are more

easily absorbed by flexible
exchange rate regimes.
Prudent macroeconomic policies
can result in low and stable inflation.
Inflation hurts the poor by lowering
growth and by redistributing real
incomes and wealth to the
detriment of those in society least
able to defend their economic
interests. High inflation can also
introduce high volatility in relative
prices and make investment a risky
decision.
Exchange rate instability may
impact the poor through the
following: (a) inefficient allocation of
resources between foreign and
domestic goods and price
distortions due to misalignments. It
could also lead to reduced
investment and competitiveness of
the tradeable sector with its
negative impact on the poor.
Furthermore, the cost to the poor
may be increased by the extent of
financial integration in the
international capital markets.
Inappropriate exchange rate
policies distort the competition of
growth by influencing the price of
tradeable versus nontradeable
goods. Apart from distorting trade
and inhibiting growth, an overly
appreciated exchange rate can
impair the relative incomes and
purchasing power of the poor
Exchange rate policies can affect
the poor through three channels:
inflation, output, and the real
exchange rate. Inflation hurts the
poor because it acts as a regressive
tax and curbs growth. Fluctuations
in output have direct impact upon
the incomes of the poor. Also a
chosen exchange rate regime can
buffer, or amplify, exogenous
shocks. The real exchange rate
can affect the poor in two ways first,
it influences the country's external
competitiveness and hence its
growth rate; secondly, a change in
the real exchange rate (through, for
example, a devaluation of the
nominal rate), can have a direct
impact on the poor.
S p e c i f i c a l l y, e x c h a n g e r a t e
instability can affect the poor
through the following channels:
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Investment growth.
Instability tends to distort price
signals and the expected rate of
return for investors; in the
presence of irreversibility effects,
the decision to wait may lead to
lower private investment and lower
growth rates.

Precautionary savings.
The propensity to save for both rich
and poor households may
increase if exchange rate
instability or macroeconomic
instability translates into higher
income uncertainty or an
increased probability of facing
borrowing constraints in “bad
times”. However, higher savings
may also increase resources
available for financial
intermediaries to lend to potential
investors, thereby stimulating
growth.

Credit market effects. A
higher degree of exchange rate or
macroeconomic instability may
heighten the perceived risk of
default by lenders and increase the
incidence of credit rationing, or
lead to a higher risk premium and
borrowing rates for private firms.
This may have adverse effect on
labor demand and the poor.

Distributional effects. High
and variable inflation may explain
large changes in the distribution of
income and wealth; such effects
may be of considerable
importance.
Inflation affects
income distribution through the
relative value of different assets
and liabilities may be by lowering
the real value of both nominal
assets and liabilities; favors
debtors and holders of real equity
over lenders and owners of
nominal assets; could also affect
negatively suppliers of labor
locked in long-term employment
contracts. The poor may suffer
from inflation through an erosion of
their nominal assets, whereas the
middle class may benefit from an
erosion of its nominal liabilities.
High inflation may also affect
income distribution indirectly by
lowering output and employment
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through a variety of channels,
including distortions in relative price
signals and their effects on
allocative efficiency.

that the purchasing power of the
poor is eroded and consequently
aggravates the poverty
phenomenon among the poor.

Exchange rate instability impacts
on the poor through unemployment,
higher price of foodstuffs, pressure
on the employed to accept lower or
no wage increases, higher costs of
borrowing, reduction in the
purchasing power of financial
assets.
It could also mean
increased return for the goods of
those households in the tradeable
sector. It is also well known that
macroeconomic volatility, high
output fluctuation and unstable
exchange rate regime impact on
poverty. For instance, the income
of the poor may be affected by a
negative impact of macroeconomic
volatility on investment and growth
due to distorted price signals and
expected rate of return. Increased
precautionary savings caused by
higher uncertainty about future
income may also lead to either
decreased or increased economic
growth.

Most studies on poverty in Nigeria
have not, as such, examined the
impact of macroeconomic shocks
on the welfare of the poor. Yet,
macroeconomic shocks have a
direct effect on the livings
standards of poor households,
through the goods, services and
financial markets.
Furthermore,
the Nigerian economy is highly
susceptible to exchange rate
changes because of the importdependent nature of its largely
uncompetitive manufacturing
industries. There is a negative
relationship between exchange
rate, depreciation and poverty. For
instance, a depreciated exchange
rate could boost exports and the
expansion of import competing
industries; it could raise the cost of
living for consumers, including the
poor. The overall expected effect is
increased employment, greater
output and consequently improved
welfare for the poor. But exchange
rate instability or unwholesome
exchange market behavior in the
country tend to aggravate poverty.
Persistent depreciation of the
currency exchange rate has led to
considerable capital flights in
recent years. It also resulted in
round-tripping activities by some of
the financial houses generating
opportunities for corruption. The
implication is that the poor is made
to suffer.

Some Recommendations and
Conclusion
The worsening of poverty in Nigeria
has been traced to several factors:
poor and inconsistent
macroeconomic policies, weak
diversification of the economic
base, gross economic
mismanagement, weak
intersectoral linkages as well as
persistence of structural
bottlenecks in the economy. The
basic causes of poverty in Nigeria
have been identified to include,
inadequate access to employment
opportunities for the poor, lack or
inadequate access to assets such
as land and capital by the poor;
inadequate access to the means of
fostering rural development in poor
regions; inadequate access to
markets for the goods and services
that the poor produce; inadequate
access to education, health,
sanitation and water services.
Exchange rate instability fuels other
macroeconomic shocks including
inflation. The implication of this is

Some Recommendations
Macroeconomic stability is a key
component of a growth-promoting
environment and is indirectly,
therefore, a foundation for any
successful poverty reduction
strategy.
The link is that
macroeconomic stability
encourages investment and
promotes productivity growth and
employment creation.
In this
sense, macroeconomic stability is a
public good.
In recent years
Nigeria's macroeconomic
environment has been relatively
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volatile and, unfortunately, trapped
in an adverse loose fiscal/tight
monetary policy mix.
A labor-shedding restructuring and
reforms in both the public sector that
was not matched with an
environment conducive to
employment creation by the private
sector (particularly by small and
medium enterprises) on the demand
side, as well as the unchecked
access to social safety nets amidst
increasing population growth rate on
the supply side, have contributed to
a dramatic worsening of labor
market conditions, a consequent
rise in unemployment, and the
resulting poverty increase.
Hence, a return to robust growth (as
the main factor in poverty reduction)
requires a stable macroeconomic
environment with a balanced fiscalmonetary policy mix and stable
exchange rate regime. To prevent
the re-emergence of economic
imbalances, a fiscal consolidation
and the reduction of overall deficits
are needed to complement the
recent monetary policy measures. A
parallel reduction in the size of the
government budget would provide
greater space for private sector
development.
Together with an
additional and necessary
recomposition of government
expenditures from consumption to
investment, these policies would
significantly strengthen Nigeria's
growth prospects.
In order for growth to be povertyreducing, the link between economic
development and labor market
improvement must be strengthened
significantly (or perhaps even reestablished). In other words, the
growth environment must be made
more labor-friendly. In the short to
medium term this would involve a
necessary reduction in the tax
wedge (payroll taxes) as well as an
increase in the flexibility of the labor
market. In the longer run, policies
are needed that will close the
mismatch of skills between labor
demand and supply, which means
promoting investment in human
capital and education.
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Price stability is an essential
component of a poverty alleviation
policy.
Inflation predominantly
hurts the poor, who have little
opportunity to protect their assets.
For this reason, low inflation in
general, and particularly low food
price inflation, should be perceived
as a genuine achievement of
recent years.
In addition, the
decline in nominal and real interest
rates brought about by the
monetary easing should work to the
advantage of the poor by
increasing their capacity to smooth
consumption.
Fiscal policy works best if it is propoor. Since the poor have a higher
propensity to spend, leaving more
resources with them during hard
times provides an effective tool
against cyclical downturns of the
economy, contributes to the wellbeing of the vulnerable, and feeds
back positively to overall
macroeconomic stability.
The tax component of fiscal policy
appears to perform its anticipated
stabilization role. Any changes to
the system to improve its pro-poor
impact should be considered
carefully, so that they do not further
increase the distortions that taxes
bring to the economy, particularly
that they do not increase the overall
tax burden. The elimination of
exemptions (tax expenditures are

directed mainly toward the rich)
complemented by an overall
reduction in payroll taxes in at least
a budget neutral way is a plausible
recommendation.
The social transfers mechanism is
still underdeveloped in Nigeria but
when properly harnessed and
efficiently managed, could play an
important role in poverty alleviation.
Currently, the major part of the
resources is not going to the most
needy. If these funds were targeted
properly, rather than being spread
more or less uniformly over the
entire consumption distribution,
they could eradicate poverty
completely twice over. Therefore,
improving the targeting of social
transfers should be an immediate
necessity. Poor targeting not only
leaves many of them vulnerable
without the help of the state, but it
also skews incentives to work and
poses a significant burden on
government finances.
Given the revenue flows from oil
exports, the Nigerian economy is
becoming wealthier but at the same
time more polarized. Therefore,
there is a strong case for good
poverty/social monitoring that
involves going beyond
aggregations and applying more
complex analytical tools, such as
various decompositions, growth
incidence, benefit incidence, etc.
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Such monitoring can provide both
the public and policymakers with a
better knowledge of whether and
how the economy is changing, and
with the ability to identify the
sources of such changes. It can
also make it possible to assess
winners and losers, and, in
particular, it can become a basis
for judging whether these
inequalities are acceptable or not.
Moreover, an ex ante assessment
of the impact of social programs on
income distribution and poverty
could become a valuable tradition.
An efficient exchange rate regime
is that which promotes economic
growth and addressing
employment policies for poverty
reduction. This is because the
essence of the poverty reduction is
to encourage (a) a high rate of
labor-absorbing growth; (b)
promoting the self-employment of
the poor by converting them into
productive entrepreneurs; (c)
increasing the productivity of the
poor workers both in wage
employment and in selfemployment; (d) ensuring
favorable terms of exchange for
the products of the poor's labor;
and (e) specially designed
employment opportunities for the
households with unusual and/or
unfavorable labor endowment.
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